/**
 * Adversarial security tests — new findings beyond the existing leak suite.
 *
 * 1. RLS is enabled with correct "own sessions only" policies, BUT the backend
 *    (db.js) runs every query through the `service_role` superuser client,
 *    which has BYPASSRLS. So the DB backstop an app is supposed to rely on is
 *    silently switched off for user data. This proves it: a user-scoped client
 *    enforces RLS (denies another user's row), while the backend's admin path
 *    reads it.
 *
 * 2. Token-cache revocation: verifyToken caches the user for a token for up to
 *    5 minutes but the cache is never purged on signout/revocation, so a
 *    captured token keeps authenticating briefly after the session is revoked.
 *
 * Requires local Supabase (`npx supabase start`).
 */
import test, { before, after } from "node:test";
import assert from "node:assert/strict";
import { createClient } from "@supabase/supabase-js";
import app from "../src/app.js";
import { getSession } from "../src/services/db.js";

const PASSWORD = "adversarial-pass-123";
const RUN_ID = Date.now();

function makeJar() {
  let cookies = {};
  return {
    capture(res) {
      for (const c of res.headers.getSetCookie ? res.headers.getSetCookie() : []) {
        const pair = c.split(";")[0];
        const eq = pair.indexOf("=");
        if (eq === -1) continue;
        cookies[pair.slice(0, eq).trim()] = pair.slice(eq + 1).trim();
      }
    },
    header() {
      return Object.entries(cookies).map(([k, v]) => `${k}=${v}`).join("; ");
    },
    get(name) {
      return cookies[name];
    },
    set(name, value) {
      cookies[name] = value;
    },
    clear() {
      cookies = {};
    },
  };
}

let server;
let base;
before(async () => {
  server = app.listen(0, "127.0.0.1");
  await new Promise((resolve) => server.once("listening", resolve));
  base = `http://127.0.0.1:${server.address().port}`;
});
after(async () => {
  if (server) await new Promise((resolve) => server.close(resolve));
});

async function api(path, { method = "GET", jar, rawCookie, body } = {}) {
  const headers = {};
  if (jar) headers["Cookie"] = jar.header();
  if (rawCookie) headers["Cookie"] = rawCookie;
  if (body !== undefined) headers["Content-Type"] = "application/json";
  const res = await fetch(`${base}${path}`, {
    method,
    headers,
    body: body !== undefined ? JSON.stringify(body) : undefined,
  });
  if (jar) jar.capture(res);
  return res;
}

async function signup(jar, tag) {
  const email = `adv-${tag}-${RUN_ID}@example.com`;
  const res = await api("/api/auth/signup", {
    method: "POST",
    jar,
    body: { email, password: PASSWORD },
  });
  if (res.status !== 200) {
    assert.fail(`signup ${tag} -> ${res.status}: ${await res.text()}`);
  }
  const data = await res.json();
  return { email, uid: data.user.uid, token: jar.get("padhle.token") };
}

const usersToCleanup = [];
after(async () => {
  const key = process.env.SUPABASE_SERVICE_ROLE_KEY;
  if (!key || !process.env.SUPABASE_URL) return;
  try {
    const admin = createClient(process.env.SUPABASE_URL, key);
    for (const u of usersToCleanup) {
      if (u?.uid) await admin.auth.admin.deleteUser(u.uid);
    }
  } catch {
    /* best-effort */
  }
});

test("RLS is the enforced data-layer backstop once the user token is threaded through", async () => {
  const jarA = makeJar();
  const jarB = makeJar();
  const userA = await signup(jarA, "a");
  const userB = await signup(jarB, "b");
  usersToCleanup.push(userA, userB);

  // A creates a session through the real API.
  const createRes = await api("/api/sessions", {
    method: "POST",
    jar: jarA,
    body: { grade: "Grade 10", subject: "math", chapter: "secret chapter" },
  });
  assert.equal(createRes.status, 201);
  const session = await createRes.json();
  const sessionId = session.id;

  // 1) RLS (user-scoped client + B's token) denies B the row → null.
  const bRead = await getSession(sessionId, userB.token);
  assert.equal(bRead, null, "RLS denies B the row at the data layer (backstop active)");

  // 2) The OWNER (A's token) reads it normally.
  const aRead = await getSession(sessionId, userA.token);
  assert.equal(aRead?.id, sessionId, "owner reads their own session via RLS");
  assert.equal(aRead.user_id, userA.uid);

  // 3) Full API: B still gets 404 (both app-code check and RLS agree).
  const bApi = await api(`/api/sessions/${sessionId}`, { jar: jarB });
  assert.equal(bApi.status, 404, "app-code check still rejects B");
});

test("a revoked token is rejected after signout (in-memory token cache is purged)", async () => {
  const jar = makeJar();
  const user = await signup(jar, "cache");
  usersToCleanup.push(user);
  assert.ok(user.token, "token captured from httpOnly cookie");

  // Prime the cache.
  const me1 = await api("/api/auth/me", { jar });
  assert.equal(me1.status, 200, "/me before signout");
  assert.equal((await me1.json()).user.uid, user.uid);

  // Sign out: revokes the Supabase session and clears cookies.
  const so = await api("/api/auth/signout", { method: "POST", jar });
  assert.equal(so.status, 200);

  // Replay the OLD token cookie (simulating a captured cookie).
  const stale = makeJar();
  stale.set("padhle.token", user.token);
  const me2 = await api("/api/auth/me", { jar: stale });

  // After the fix (invalidateToken on signout), the cache is purged and the
  // stale token must be rejected — NOT served from the cache.
  assert.equal(me2.status, 401, "revoked stale token must NOT authenticate after signout");
});